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Аbstract. In this paper, the author first presents a Multiple Streams model of policymaking in-
troduced by John Kingdon and elaborated by Robert W. Porter. The relevance and usefulness 
of the model are then exemplified by analyzing a reform in Argentine education. Kingdon and 
Porter argued that, for education policies to succeed, the following three streams of actions 
need to meet: problem must be clearly defined, feasible solutions offered, and political 
consensus obtained. In 1993, Argentina passed the Federal Law of Education in the attempt to 
reduce large educational inequities between the rich and the poor. The Law largely failed 
because (1) problems were narrowly defined only by the government, (2) solutions were one-
sided, primarily focusing on the financial, and neglecting contextual and implementation 
problems, and (3) political will existed only at the highest level, while actual capacities of 
implementing units were far below those needed for the reform. Analyzing policies through 
the lens of the Multiple Streams model of policymaking is recommended for other po-
licymakers. 
Кey words: Porter, Multiple Streams model, Argentina, Federal Law of Education, Education 
policy, reform. 
Multiple Streams model 
In traditional model of policymaking, the following temporally and functio-
nally distinct stages are recognized (Porter, 1995): (1) identification of po-
licy problems, (2) agenda setting (focusing governmental attention to the 
problem), (3) development of policy proposals, (4) adoption of policies, (5) 
implementation of policies, and, (6) evaluation of policies’ implementation 
and impact. This Policy Stages model and its variants were more useful than 
earlier institutional approaches to policymaking in that they: (1) focused 
attention to the process of policymaking rather than on various institutions 
in charge of policymaking, (2) evaluated intended and unintended con-
sequences of policies and treated them as starting points for future policies, 
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and (3) dissected complex policymaking into discrete, manageable, rational 
analytical units (Porter, 1995). 
However, Kingdon (1984) and Porter (1995) noted that many authors 
rightfully criticized this traditional model as too rational and linear, in that it 
did not accurately reflect actual policymaking, which is often unsystematic, 
disorderly, and politically charged. In real world, it is often that only one 
policy option is considered, that political compromise requires that policies 
be vaguely defined, or that politicians pick information about existing 
problems only to push a predetermined solution that is on their own agenda. 
Following Kingdon (1984) and according to Porter (1995), needed 
changes in policymaking can come about when multiple sets of activities (so 
called “streams”) – defining the problem, suggesting solutions, and obtai-
ning political consensus – occur simultaneously, thus opening a window of 
opportunity for the changes to happen. Problems stream denotes which so-
cial conditions are perceived by people as problems which need to be reme-
died by government action. Citizens, media, and interest groups often define 
problems and their potential causes. Frequently, it is difficult to clearly 
define the problem and its history because many actors lobby for their own 
views about them. Solutions stream consists of policy alternatives that are 
generated by mid-level government officials and administrators, policy 
advocates, and academics. Well crafted policy solutions entail sensitive 
development of sequence, content, and timing of reform, translation of po-
licy directives into programs, generation of strategies for adoption of policy 
and management of the opposition, and taking advantage of supporters of 
the reform. Politics stream consists of political events that may or may not 
be favorable to the policy. Elections, changes in government ministers, and 
public protests can powerfully influence whether or not a particular problem 
will actually be solved. The Multiple Streams model is not linear, since 
three streams flow relatively independently through the policy system; 
ideally, a compelling problem is linked to a plausible solution that is politi-
cally feasible. In reality though, strong efforts must be devoted to making 
the three streams meet (through lobbying, research, communication, coaliti-
ons, interactions, bargaining,  media, etc), and, further, to prolong their 
simultaneous flow. 
Multiple Streams model is useful because it argues that numerous real-
life contextual factors – political events, bureaucratic procedures, interest 
groups, etc. – largely shape the future of a public policy. It forces all 
interested and involved actors to recognize realities of policymaking and 
pragmatically act to see policies come to life. Also, like the traditional 
Policy Stages model, it allows for policies to be dissected and analyzed in Jelena Teodorovic  24
broad, generalized terms (problems, solutions, and politics). Such analysis 
can be very educational and highly valuable to other policymakers who are 
faced with social problems that need to be fixed in a given political milieu. 
To exemplify the usefulness of the Multiple Streams model, an educa-
tional reform in Argentina will be analyzed. First, a short section below will 
highlight the successes and pitfalls of the Argentine Federal Law of Edu-
cation. Then, the subsequent sections will show that lack of convergence of 
problems, solutions and politics streams contributed to failure of Argen-
tina’s attempt to address its educational ills. 
Background: Argentine Federal Law of Education 
In 2001, Argentina had the sixteenth largest economy in the world (Dupre, 
2001), the largest middle class in South America, and per capita income of 
$8,970/person (World Bank, 2000). However, Argentina also had one of the 
most unequal income disparities and inequalities between its rich and poor 
inhabitants, with education being among the hardest hit (Watkins, 1999; 
World Bank, 2000). 
In 1993, Argentina passed the Federal Law of Education whose pri-
mary goal was to equalize the opportunity of quality schooling among its 
population, i.e. to compensate for the education disadvantages faced by 
Argentina’s poorest children. The national Ministry of Education developed 
a Social Education Plan (Plan Social Educativo, or PSE), which aimed to 
provide special pedagogical instruction to the poorest children, support 
teacher development, finance repairing and building of schools, and estab-
lish scholarships to help students from the disadvantaged families stay in 
secondary school. 
In 1998, the PSE impacted 21.542 or 47.6% of schools and nearly 3 
million or 34.5% of students mostly attending primarily pre-school and 
primary school. The initial results showed that PSE was strongly pro-poor: 
60% of PSE beneficiaries came from the poorest quintile of population, 
while 80% accounted for two poorest quintiles (World Bank, 2000). In 
addition, the results obtained after five years were quite tangible: almost 
2.000 schools were built, and 13.000,000 textbooks and 5.600 computers 
delivered (Reimers, 2000). More importantly, the repetition rate in primary 
school declined, and the primary students’ academic achievement improved. 
Furthermore, the most positive results were found in those provinces with 
the largest number of homes where basic needs were unmet (Reimers, 2000). 
However, the Social Education Plan neglected the needs of the poor at 
the secondary educational level. Enrollment rates in secondary school Why education policies fail 
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between 1992 and 1997 have actually decreased from 70% to 62% for the 
poorest 10% of students, and from 75% to 69% for the second poorest 
segment (World Bank, 2000). Only 24% of those between 18 and 24 years 
of age among the poor had secondary education (World Bank, 2000). In 
1974, 30% of university students were coming from the lower 50% of the 
population, while in 1998 that number was only 11% (Rozada & Menendez, 
2000). At the same time, the bar to the minimum educational level required 
by many employers had been raised: the completion of secondary education 
had become a minimum requirement to enter formal employment because of 
new productive processes and the growing competition in the labor market 
(World Bank, 1998). Those who did not satisfy the requirement were mostly 
doomed to low-paid menial labor (World Bank, 2000). 
In addition, the Social Education Plan mostly focused on providing the 
children in primary school with the appropriate “infrastructure” – textbooks 
and classrooms. These provisions had effects (as they improved student ach-
ievement and lowered the drop-out rates of poor children), but only to a cer-
tain level. The Social Education Plan was a compensatory policy that could 
not remedy all it had set out to do, since its major tool – financial help to the 
poor schools – was limited in the amount, but also in the extent to which it 
could solve the problems not necessarily dependent on money (such as tea-
cher distribution rules or inefficient teacher training, as will be seen later). 
Problems stream 
As previously said, for a social condition to be a problem, people must 
perceive it is such, and also see it as the condition amenable to a government 
action (Porter, 1995). In Argentina, prior to the passing of the Federal Law, 
everyone seemed to think that education was in serious crisis – the govern-
ment, the parents, the students, the teachers. During five military periods 
between 1930 and 1983, Argentine education suffered immensely: univer-
sities were infiltrated by secret police, university autonomy ended, students 
persecuted, teachers fired and professors disappeared (Rock, 1993). Teacher 
salaries were low and quality of teaching diluted (Leonard, 1999). First 
democratic government of Raul Alfonsin did not produce desired changes in 
Argentine education. During this period, a National Pedagogical Congress 
(government’s attempt to gather public opinion and consensus on what 
educational policies should be in democratic Argentina) failed because it 
lasted too long and lost its political momentum. Educational budget got 
burdened by the policy of free tuition at the university level. Finally, the 
ministers of Argentina’s 23 provinces fought to establish and protect their Jelena Teodorovic  26
federalist rights from the real or imagined control from the national gover-
nment (Hanson, 1996). Although everyone seemed impatient to see Argen-
tine education move forward, if asked by what they meant that the “edu-
cation was in crisis” – every mentioned group would have come up with 
quite different definition of what the real problem was for them. 
The teachers – major implementers of many educational reforms – saw 
as the main problems to be addressed by the reform bad working conditions 
for the teachers and disregard for the teaching profession. 
First, teachers were often paid less than bus drivers and many held 
another job to complement a salary earned during a 4-5 hr long school day 
(Dupre, 2001). Teacher wages in 1990 were a half of those in 1960 and a 
third of those in 1965 in real dollars (Parrado, 1998). There was extreme dis-
parity among teachers’ salaries in the nation, both for the carrying out of equi-
valent tasks and for the level of qualifications (Randall & Anderson, 1999). 
Second, the teachers were also unhappy with the level of respect given 
to them by two democratic governments. They were disappointed that du-
ring the ten years of Alfonsin and Menem governments, the administrations 
not only failed to involve them in the decision-making process, but also 
purposefully rejected to hear teachers’ voices. The teacher unions were not 
permitted to participate in Alfonsin’s Pedagogical Congress, nor were 
teachers heard by the Menem government unless they staged protests. The 
teachers saw the government as detached from and uninterested in educatio-
nal practice and thus unable to truly identify the real problems in education. 
Government’s position in the problems stream is more complicated. By 
passing the Federal Law of Education, government of Carlos Saul Menem 
wanted to establish itself as different from the previous – democratic, but 
less efficient – Alfonsin government. Menem’s government also saw the 
initiation of educational reform as a natural continuation of its efforts to 
revitalize Argentina. After all, the hallmark of the Menem government was 
reforms – reforms in finances, trade, and privatization. This interpretation 
fits well with Porter’s observation that the developments in the political 
sphere – such as a change of government – can be powerful factors in 
agenda setting. 
On the other hand, the Menem administration came to define the major 
problems in education as those of inefficiency, inequity, low quality, and 
bureaucracy because these problems necessitated a certain type of solution 
that would also help solve the larger problem the government was facing. 
Many of the reforms undertaken by the Menem government were initiated 
and/or supported by the international banks and donors. Many of the loans 
Argentina received to recover its economy carried with them conditionalities Why education policies fail 
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of reduced governmental spending (especially in social sector), fiscal 
responsibility and management reorganization. As a means of reducing the 
burden of a large social sector to satisfy the World Bank and the IMF, the 
government initiated the 1992 and 1993 reforms, decentralizing education 
and shifting the financial and organizational burden onto the provinces. To 
fit this type of solution, it was only natural for the federal government that 
the major problems in Argentine education be identified as large bureau-
cracy and inefficiency. This exemplifies the dynamics of the Porter’s model 
of three streams: the solution to one problem can conveniently be extended 
to serve as the solution of the other, and the problem does not necessarily 
need to precede the solution. 
According to Porter, the more links that could be built between the 
problem and solution the better. However, the existence of two drastically 
different visions of major problems in Argentine education implied that dif-
ferent actors concerned with the same issue would necessarily hold different 
views on what solutions should be. This state of the affairs at the outset 
lowered the chances of successful reform. 
Solutions stream 
The solution to the “crisis in Argentine education” turned out to be a so-
lution only to problems defined by the government. As mentioned earlier, 
the teacher unions opposed the Federal Law; they not only thought that 
teacher salaries were low, but they also expected that shifting of financial 
and organizational burden onto the provinces would further worsen teach-
ers’ working conditions and lower their salaries. Government was pushing 
for its solution, as more obligations for the provinces meant less spending 
from the national budget. International donors – having a vested interest that 
Argentina pay its debts and reduce its deficit on time – financed educational 
projects that supported government’s vision. CTERA, Argentina’s largest 
teacher union, especially resented the World Bank for supporting and 
pushing for reduced role of national government in education, as the union 
believed that Argentine civil society was weak to begin with and that, ha-
ving already been hard hit by the privatization impacts, could not handle 
more financial burden (Puiggros, 1996). 
The distrust of foreign “intrusions” into national matters is not unique 
to Argentina. According to Porter, and based on other examples in education 
policy making, the public and organizations are more receptive to the 
internal rather than to imported, external ideas; if a new idea comes from the 
outside, it needs to have a legitimate sponsor on the inside to be accepted. In Jelena Teodorovic  28
case of Argentina, the public and Argentine teachers did not see the 
government as the legitimate sponsor of foreign ideas but as an ally of 
foreign interests (Puiggros, 1996). Even when the adopted foreign policy is 
theoretically sound, it is its outcomes in real life (or even the circumstances 
that surround it) that will determine people’s disposition toward that policy. 
For example, even if reducing government’s spending on social services 
might benefit everyone in the country in the long run (the budget cuts should 
result in greater ability of government to pay off its debt, which should in 
turn lead to increased fiscal flexibility later), the idea of reduced spending 
will be anathemized in a situation where the rich profit from the recession, 
while the poor become poorer. The general public cannot help but feel 
cheated in such situation, and will inevitably resent otherwise sound ele-
ments of the policy. 
The fact that crafting of the reform proceeded without seriously 
addressing many key issues advocated by the teachers proved to be a large 
obstacle during the implementation of the reform. In addition, government 
failed to anticipate several other educational issues that would detract from 
Federal Law’s attempts to equalize education between the rich and the poor. 
As previously said, well planned policy solutions will address not only the 
content of the policy, but consider all contextual factors that may aid or 
harm the policy. Specifically, the Federal Law partly failed because it did 
not tackle the problems connected with initial and in-service teacher 
preparation, teacher distribution rules, student selection practices, budgetary 
issues, and tax policies. 
First, initial and in-service teacher training failed to prepare teachers 
for the increased demands on teaching put forth by the Federal Law – 
namely to improve pedagogical methods used in classrooms and foster 
educational development in students of various socioeconomic backgrounds. 
The diversity of teacher training institutions and lack of coordination of 
states’ educational laws has led to the diversity in training, which has in turn 
led to uneven preparation of teachers (Randall & Anderson, 1999). There is 
enormous gap between initial teacher training and current methodological 
developments: teachers are not trained to work in teams or address the needs 
of students from different social groups, they are not taught how to behave 
in a creative manner, and teacher training schools do not contribute to par-
ticipation or flexibility (Randall & Anderson, 1999). On-the-job profes-
sional support for the teachers is almost non-existent: information or 
feedback on the performance of their students is not readily available, there 
is no tradition of offering or receiving advice and suggestions about teaching 
either from colleagues or the parents, and evaluation of teachers is rather Why education policies fail 
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bureaucratic and disconnected from performance (Alvarez & Majmudar, 
2001). 
Second, there is a great disparity between the Argentine provinces in 
the norms regulating teacher hiring, evaluation, supervision and promotion, 
each according to their laws (Alvarez & Majmudar, 2001). The teachers with 
higher number of points (earned through their degrees, courses attended and 
length of service) have the right to choose where they want to teach in the 
district (Fiszbein, 1999). The point system generates a pattern whereby the 
youngest and most inexperienced teachers get the “worst” schools, schools 
in poor, rural and marginal urban areas, where there is the greatest need for 
the good teachers (Fiszbein, 1999; Liang, 1999). Even though the incentive 
system of rewarding work in “difficult” areas is in place in many provinces, 
teachers who work in rural or other “difficult” areas are paid 10-30% less 
than their urban counterparts (Liang, 1999). So many justifications for which 
the bonuses can be paid exist that the reward distribution in reality depends 
on the will of the officials formulating the salary policies; this, in turn, can 
cause the salary disparities across geographical area due to the over-time 
accumulative effect (Liang, 1999). Low initial abilities of the teachers and 
fewer chances of in-service training in schools for poor children just 
perpetuate the vicious circle of poverty (Randall & Anderson, 1999; Alvarez 
& Majmudar, 2001). 
Third, the rooted practice of many school authorities can also sabotage 
any meaningful reform of equalizing educational opportunity for the poor. 
Children enrolled in the public system attend the school within their district 
(radio escolar). The existence of several schools within that district has over 
the years resulted in a complex and mostly informal system of distribution 
of those children into better schools or worse schools. School authorities 
retain significant discretion in selection of students, which is far from trans-
parent, and personal contacts can play a big role in enrollment of children in 
schools with good reputation completely outside of their district (Fiszbein, 
1999). The authorities can reduce the number of the entry slots for their 
school as a means of denying the poor the entrance to their school. There is 
a historical pattern of giving entry slots of good schools to the children of 
the influential even if they are from different radio escolar (Fiszbein, 1999). 
The schools can also “get rid” of the problem students by giving referrals to 
other schools; there is some evidence that students from low-income fami-
lies tend to be over-represented among the “transferred” (Fiszbein, 1999). 
Often times, students self-select themselves into certain schools, based on 
the presence of the “non-discriminatory” school director or friends from the 
same socioeconomic background (Fiszbein, 1999). Jelena Teodorovic  30
Fourth, no thoughtful attention was given to the budgetary problems. 
Only after the street demonstrations of 1992 did the government include the 
fiscal stipulation in the Federal Law. However, the law did not specify 
where the funds would come from, how they would be spent or what the 
projected costs for reforms were (Hanson, 1996). In addition, the national 
government devised no enforcement tools that would secure that the funds 
distributed to the provinces from regular, federal budget for education be 
spent on policies the national government thought were compatible with na-
tional vision of improving quality in education; instead, the provinces conti-
nued to devise their own budgets for education according to their own laws. 
Fifth, government failed to see that Argentine tax policies also contri-
buted to the economic and educational disparities between the rich and the 
poor, which undermined the attempts of the Federal Law to better educa-
tional opportunities for the poor. The public spending on education is not 
progressive, as the distribution of public secondary, and especially tertiary 
education is pro-middle class and antipoor (World Bank, 2000). The return 
for the primary education is only 3%, for secondary education a low of 10% 
and for tertiary a very high of 29% (i.e., by finishing primary education, one 
can expect to profit only 3% of the investment in that level of education, 
while by finishing university the profit is almost 30% of the investment). 
This presents a large incentive to finish the university; however, only middle 
and upper class profit from the free higher education, as the poor – consi-
dering their high drop-out and low graduation rates - mostly obtain only pri-
mary school diploma (World Bank, 2000). 
Lack of serious considerations of these aspects of the national educa-
tion reform seemed to be the hallmark of the policy formulation and deci-
sion-making of the Argentine government. All the unresolved issues surfa-
ced during the implementation process, and prevented the reform from hel-
ping the poor, only proving that the reform that starts out flawed and ina-
dequate has a small chance of success. 
Politics stream 
As can be seen from previous discussion, the political will for the reform 
existed at the highest level. This should have been a fortunate circumstance 
for Argentina, as frequently the attempts at reforms fail because they don’t 
make a priority on government’s agenda table. However, the reform cannot 
happen if other political realities, such as the capacity of administration to 
successfully carry out tasks, or the will of provincial bureaucrats who im-
plement the policy are lacking. Why education policies fail 
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One of the impediments to political feasibility of the 1993 reform was 
the inefficient and large national Ministry of Education. Educational centra-
lism developed a large bureaucracy that perpetuated itself and that it was 
hard to change (Randall & Anderson, 1999). The attempts of reforming the 
Ministry were also presenting a barrier to the reform in education. The pre-
sident, unhappy about the state of education, would appoint the new mini-
ster, who would usually be not the most effective professional for the job, 
but a politically suitable person; he would also bring with him a whole new 
team of inexperienced senior officials into the Ministry; when the instituti-
onal change did not happen quickly, the president would be pressured to 
replace the minister; the arrival of the new minister would be characterized 
by the same political and impatient decision making (Hanson, 1999). The 
country saw five educational ministers from 1989 to 1993 (Hanson, 1999). 
The lower rank officials of the ministry, who have more stable jobs, have a 
tendency to hold power within their work domain, which can frequently be a 
barrier to introduction of new programs (Hanson, 1999). Thus, the lack of 
long term and effective education planning on behalf of the national Mi-
nistry further constrained the development of a unified vision for Argentine 
education. 
Similar to the Ministry of Education, the whole country was characte-
rized by the lack of continuity in political leadership and participatory 
democracy. There was no tradition of participation in education system and 
there was lack of persons trained to participate (Randall & Anderson, 1999). 
The historical interventions of national governments into the provincial 
matters disabled the provinces from developing their own capacity of dea-
ling with the problems in education. Even today, the national government 
wants to delegate its previous obligations in education to the provinces on 
the one hand, while on the other still helps them out financially; while this 
may be appropriate for such a sudden and large move of responsibilities, the 
government does little to invest in long-term capacity building of the pro-
vinces that would enable them to handle educational challenges on their own 
(and with potentially greater impact than the national government, as they 
are more familiar with the issues in their own states). To make matters 
worse, it is usually the poorest provinces that are proportionally helped the 
most (again, in this situation it would be merciless to leave them with no 
support); this prevents them more than the richer provinces from developing 
the appropriate infrastructure, laws and professional support, only perpetua-
ting the vicious cycle of dependence on national government and increasing 
the educational gap between the rich and poor provinces. Jelena Teodorovic  32
The previous point is supported by the research of Diane Rhoten who 
found that the poorest province of the three she examined, Jujuy, accepted 
the reform in theory, but did not and could not try to implement it, while the 
richer provinces had more means and capacity to implement the required 
changes. Paradoxically, Jujuy, the most incapable of carrying out the burden 
of the changes, was the most compliant of the three provinces in accepting 
the reform (Rhoten, 2000). This further testifies to the different conditions 
and mentalities existing in different provinces, as well as to the inability of 
some provinces to even articulate and define its problems, let alone act on 
them. The major recommendation of the research was for the national policy 
to pay attention to local realities (i.e. interpretations and actions of local go-
vernments and populations of the national policy) in order to be successful; 
if the national government uniformly doled out the same responsibilities to 
the very different provinces, and did not seriously consider genuine specifi-
cities of each in formulating the national policy, than the policy would meet 
various success. The policy itself might not be bad, but could be blind to the 
need to initiate the inevitably different implementation processes. Evalua-
tion needs to be done of how provinces view the process of decentralization 
and assuming of responsibilities of providing secondary education so that 
the feedback can improve national policy and make it more flexible and in 
touch with reality, thus making it more successful (Rhoten, 2000; Rozada & 
Menedez, 2003). 
Unfortunately for Argentina, its Federal Law of Education was also 
eroded due to outside economic events. This exemplifies Porter’s observa-
tion that politics stream flows independently of the other two and that sud-
den developments in the political arena can be powerful forces in the policy 
arena. Due to economic crises of 1995 and 1998, the economic gap between 
the rich and the poor in Argentina increased and diminished the ability of 
the poor to participate in secondary education. From 1994 to 1998 urban 
poverty increased from 22% to 29%; with the rural poor, the poverty level is 
probably around 34% (World Bank, 2000). The share of income received by 
the lowest 20% decreased from 4.55% in 1994 to 3.80% in 1998, while the 
richest 20% increased their income from 51.40% to 54.25% in the same time 
period. The unemployment rates for the poor had been climbing and had 
passed 20% (World Bank, 2000). Not only did the poor parents have harder 
time paying for transportation and educational expenses, but they also could 
not financially endure the economic recession without the help of their older 
children, who stayed at home to perform household chores or work at menial 
and poorly paid jobs. For the poor children, economic difficulties were a 
major reason for dropping out (World Bank, 2000). Why education policies fail 
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Based on the observations above, it seems that the existing political mi-
lieu and administrative setup did not offer a fertile ground for the educatio-
nal reform to take up. While political will existed on the highest governmen-
tal level, in reality the policy was not feasible. The lack of political determi-
nation at the lower bureaucratic levels, lack of appropriate capacity of the 
national and state governments, historically present administrative and profes-
sional gap between the poorer and richer provinces, and failure of the educa-
tional reform to address these issues, as well as economic crises of 1995 and 
1998 all weakened the political impetus necessary for the successful change 
(World Bank, 2000). 
Summary 
Overall, it seemed that for Argentina, only partial coupling of two Porter’s 
streams existed – the problem was recognized, and political will existed on 
the highest level, but the plausible policy was missing. The problems stream 
was not coherent, as many undercurrents pulled in their own direction, since 
various stakeholders had their own definitions of the problem. The politics 
stream looked much more like a dribble than a torrent, since the policy was 
not truly politically feasible due to the incoherent division of power between 
and lack of administrative and professional capacities of the provincial and 
national governments. And, finally, the solutions stream was running its 
own course, quite out of touch with barriers on the ground, and thus unable 
to make the connection with the other two. 
For the successful reform to have a chance at life, the problems must be 
first thoroughly examined. Each of the major stakeholder groups should 
identify its most pressing problems with the educational system. The final, 
smaller list of the specific problems that the reform would try to target 
should be made in such a way that each group has at least its most crucial 
grievance included in the governmental agenda. It should be clear to all that 
only compromise can lead to fulfillment of every group’s requests, as no 
side completely controls the situation and single-handedly determines the 
outcome of the reform. In case of Argentina, the federal government was to 
blame for failing to understand this. 
Once the problems are clearly defined and prioritized, the solutions 
should be comprised accordingly: the biggest complaint of each major 
stakeholder group should be addressed even if it means that achievement of 
every group’s overall goals is somewhat delayed. Only by having a vested 
interest in the reform, every entity will try its best to see it succeed. Again, 
in Argentina, the federal government wanted to see all of its problems gone Jelena Teodorovic  34
without realizing that their solution held no incentive for other groups to 
want to implement the reform. 
It should be noted that agreements on problems and solutions need to 
be pursued with full force and in relatively short period of time. This is not 
to say that the identification of the problems and solutions should be 
superficial; an appropriate task force in charge of the reform and comprised 
of several experts representing each stakeholder group should intensely 
work together, research possible options, and investigate potential obstacles. 
If the obstacles are too great to be overcome, they need to become part of 
the problem and be accordingly addressed. For example, in Argentina’s 
case, administrative inaptitude and non-binding sharing of responsibilities 
between the national government and provinces were large obstacles to 
implementation of the main aim of the reform – equalization of the op-
portunity for the poor. Those obstacles needed to be resolved so that the 
reform could proceed; by clarifying the obligations of each governmental 
office and making their actions binding and accountable, the government 
could have cleared the way for the meaningful reform to occur. 
The failure of the problems, solutions and politics streams to meet 
provided little hope for the success of the educational reform. The Federal 
Law of Education seems to have been doomed from the outset: it was rushed 
and ill-defined, it neglected many issues important for its implementation, 
and it failed to galvanize support needed for its realization. Other policy-
makers should learn from the Argentine example: for policy to succeed, 
thoughtful consideration of problems, solutions and politics streams needs to 
be undertaken; obstacles on all levels recognized and addressed, and imple-
mentation carried out with full force. 
 
Note. This paper is the result of the Project which is financially supported 
by Serbian Ministry of Science (2006-2010): „Education for knowledge-
based society“ (No 149001).  
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Јелена Теодоровић 
ЗБОГ ЧЕГА ОБРАЗОВНЕ РЕФОРМЕ ПРОПАДАЈУ:  
МОДЕЛ ВИШЕСТРУКИХ ТОКОВА  
Апстракт 
У овом раду аутор представља модел вишеструких токова који је осмислио 
Џон Кингдон, а разрадио Роберт Портер. Релевантност и корист овог модела за 
анализирање образовних реформи су приказани на примеру реформе аргентин-
ског образовања. Кингдон и Портер су аргументовали да је за успех образов-
них реформи потребно да се три следећа тока акције сретну: проблеми у обра-
зовању морају да буде јасно дефинисани, одговарајућа решења понуђена и по-
литички консензус постигнут. Године 1993. Аргентина је донела Федерални за-
кон о образовању покушавајући да смањи велике образовне разлике између бо-
гатих и сиромашних. Ова реформа је углавном пропала због следећег: (1) про-
блеми су били уско дефинисани и то само од стране владе, (2) решења су била 
једнострана и претежно фокусирана на финансијски аспект реформе, занемару-Jelena Teodorovic  36
јући контекстуалне проблеме и проблеме имплементације и (3) политичка воља 
је  постојала  само  на  највишем  нивоу,  док  су  стварни  капацитети  актера  у 
имплементацији реформе били веома слаби. Анализирање образовних реформи 
кроз модел вишеструких токова се препоручује другим доносиоцима одлука у 
образовању. 
Кључне речи: модел вишеструких токова, Аргентина, Федерални закон о обра-
зовању, образовна политика, реформа. 
 
 
 
Елена Теодорович 
ПРИЧИНЫ НЕУДАЧ РЕФОРМ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ:  
МОДЕЛЬ МНОГОКРАТНЫХ ТЕЧЕНИЙ  
Резюме 
В предлагаемой работе автор презентирует модель многосторонних течений, 
осмысленную Джоном Кингдоном и разработанную Робертом Портером. Зна-
чимость и полезность данной модели для проведения анализа реформ образо-
вания показаны на примере реформы аргентинской системы образования. Кин-
гдон и Портер обосновали положение о том, что для удачного проведения ре-
форм образования необходимо обеспечить пересечение трех течений деятель-
ности: проблемы в образовании должны быть четко определены, затем, необ-
ходимо предложить и соответствующие решения, а также добиться политичес-
кого консенсуса. В 1993 году Аргентиной был принят Федеральный закон об 
образовании с целью преодоления крупного разрыва между состоятельными и 
малоимущими  слоями  населения.  Реформа,  однако,  в  основном  не  удалась, 
вследствие следующих причин: (1) проблемы были определены предельно узко, 
причем только со стороны Правительства; (2) решения отличались односто-
ронностью, фокусируясь главным образом на финансовом аспекте реформы и 
отодвигая на второй план контекстуальные проблемы и проблемы внедрения, и 
(3) политическая воля существовала лишь на высшем уровне, тогда как реа-
льные  капацитеты  участников  во  внедрении  реформы  были  предельно  сла-
быми. Проведение анализа реформ образования по модели многосторонних те-
чений рекомендуется и другим факторам принятия решений в образовании. 
Ключевые  слова:  модель  многосторонних  течений,  Аргентина,  Федеральный 
закон об образовании, образовательная политика, реформа. 